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INTRODUCTION
The literature on the American jury1 too rarely considers the experience
of other countries. This Article describes how the now over 200-year debate
in the United States over the proper role and form of American jury practice
suffers from the usually unstated, but typically unquestioned, premise of
American exceptionalism,2 and suggests that American jury practice could
benefit from considering what other systems may have to offer.3
Scholars have paid much time and attention in recent years to jury
reform in the United States.4 Two prominent topics in this conversation,
both of which form the heart of this Article, have been (1) the
appropriateness of allowing jurors to ask written questions of witnesses or
otherwise become more informed decision makers,5 and (2) the proper
approach to jury selection.6 The discussion of these topics, however, has
1. There are other jury systems in the Americas. This Article uses the
terminology of “the American jury” as a reference specifically to juries in the
United States of America.
2. See generally Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and
Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277 (2002) (discussing the cultural
origins of American civil procedure).
3. See generally Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems Around the World, 4 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 275, 277 (2008) (“Comparative work on world jury systems
and other lay participation systems, although still at an early stage, holds
significant promise. Such research can address longstanding questions about the
impact of lay legal participation on democracy, legal consciousness, and the
unique perspectives and contributions that lay citizens bring to legal decision
making. As a scientific matter, many of these questions are difficult to answer
when one is limited to studying an existing jury system with long-settled trial
practices and stable public and elite attitudes toward jury trial. The cross-country
comparisons allow us to take advantage of existing variation in different
countries, akin to a natural experiment . . . .” (citation omitted)).
4. See, e.g., GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L.
WATERS, THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A
COMPENDIUM REPORT (2007), available at http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/~/media
/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx.
5. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil
Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter
Juror Discussions During Civil Trials] (reporting on and evaluating the Arizona
experiment with juror questions and allowing jurors to discuss the case predeliberation); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in
Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256 (1996)
[hereinafter Increasing Juror Participation] (advocating for allowing jurors to ask
questions); Kara Lundy, Note, Juror Questioning of Witnesses: Questioning the
United States Criminal Justice System, 85 MINN. L. REV. 2007 (2001) (advocating
against allowing juror questions in criminal trials).
6. See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory
Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377
(2010); Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for
the Selection of Impartial Juries, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (1991); Hilary Weddell,
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primarily taken place on a theoretical plane. The only concrete data comes
from the limited instances where judges have allowed experimentation in
their courtrooms. This experimentation, unfortunately, has been infrequent
and narrow in scope. Regarding jury selection, for example, although
practice varies in America about whether judges, advocates, or both
question the jury7 and for how long,8 all courts allow jury questioning—
referred to as voir dire—on average for two hours.9 During trial, however,
no American courts allow jurors to directly question witnesses orally, and
only 14% of state criminal trials allow juror-written questions to
witnesses.10 Less than 1% of state courts allow jurors to discuss the
evidence before deliberations commence in criminal trials.11 Ultimately,
the United States has limited data to evaluate the effectiveness of jury
questioning, no examples of trials with active oral questioning by jurors,
and very limited data on jury deliberation during trial.
Although such information is lacking in America, other countries have
conducted these evaluations of their jury systems.12 Some of these systems
are British-based, meaning they have an adversarial system, common law
rules of evidence, and a law/fact division of responsibilities between judge
and jury.13 Within the British-derived systems, American jury reformists
should be particularly interested in systems of roughly the same vintage as
the United States. The British system itself has evolved and changed over
many centuries.14 Each British-derived system is born out of the version of
British justice as it existed at the pertinent moment. Although comparative
law cannot control for all differences between nations,15 nations are of the
Note, A Jury of Whose Peers?: Eliminating Racial Discrimination in Jury
Selection Procedures, 33 B.C. J. LAW & SOC. JUST. 453 (2013).
7. MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 27–28.
8. See id. at 77–78.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 32 tbl.24, 34–35.
11. See id. at 32 tbl.24.
12. See Hans, supra note 3, at 276. For a summary of jury systems in place
in Europe see John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication and
Human Rights in Europe, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83, 93–100 (2007).
13. See generally Hans, supra note 3, at 278–79 (“Juries are usually
embedded within an adversarial common law system in which oral testimony by
witnesses is the predominant method of evidence presentation, a sharp contrast
with the civil law tradition of document-based litigation. The adversarial approach
favors passive decision makers, whereas the inquisitorial approach promotes the
active involvement of decision makers in the development of evidence.” (citations
omitted)); accord Jackson & Kovalev, supra note 12, at 95–96.
14. For a detailed history of the British jury system, see Douglas G. Smith,
The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
377, 390–420 (1996).
15. Some of the Author’s colleagues are concerned with the contemporary
use of the word “nation,” noting that we can no longer equate “nation” with “state”
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greatest utility when they are most similar.16 These nations can serve as
useful illustrations of the possible outcomes of American jury reforms.17
Within the British-derived court systems, one nation of very similar
vintage to the United States is Malta, a member of the European Union and
Commonwealth of Nations.18 Malta is a small island nation in the
Mediterranean Sea,19 which from 1798 to 1964 was part of the British
Empire.20 Perhaps surprisingly, Malta and the United States—at least from
the perspective of their jury practices—are essentially twins separated at
birth. The American jury system is a direct descendant of the eighteenth
century British system,21 whereas the Maltese system is a direct
descendant of the early nineteenth century British system.22 The first
Maltese jury trial occurred about 25 years after the adoption of the United
States Constitution.23
Although substantial differences exist between Malta and the United
States as nations, the similarities of Maltese and American jury trials are
patent. If an American trial lawyer were to observe a Maltese jury trial, he
would witness a familiar and comfortable scene. The courtroom is set up
physically the same as an American court.24 The Maltese system, like its
American counterpart, is adversarial rather than inquisitorial. A jury is
selected and empaneled to decide the issues of fact. The overall procedural
structures—opening statements, testimony presented through alternating
or even “country” given that so many countries are now multinational in their
makeup. Nonetheless, this Article opts for “nation” for clarity in distinction to a
“state” of the United States. No offense nor confusion is intended.
16. See John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617,
626–27 (1998).
17. See Hans, supra note 3, at 277 (“The cross-country comparisons allow us
to take advantage of existing variation in different countries, akin to a natural
experiment.” (citation omitted)).
18. The World Factbook: Malta, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www
.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mt.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2015) (expand “Government” section).
19. Id. (expand “Geography” section).
20. Id. (expand “Introduction” section).
21. Even today—for purposes of interpreting the civil jury right in United
States federal court—the reference point is jury rights in England in 1791. See
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (“[T]he thrust of the [Seventh]
Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791 . . . .”); see
generally Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005 (1992).
22. See Comment, The Jury System in Malta, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 570, 570
(1964) (transcript of a public lecture delivered by J.J. Cremona in the Royal
University of Malta on the December 7, 1960).
23. Id. (trial by jury introduced in Malta in 1815).
24. The information regarding the set-up of the Maltese jury system was
derived by the Author’s first-hand observation of a Maltese jury trial from June
6, 2011 to June 17, 2011.
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examination and cross-examination of witnesses, evidentiary objections
and rulings, closing arguments, judge’s instructions, verdict, and
judgment—appear rather American (or British). Any American trial
lawyer would not only recognize a Maltese trial, but the lawyer would also
understand it, as Maltese trials are often conducted in English.25
For American jury reformists, Malta’s greatest utility to the United
States may come from focusing on where the two systems diverge. The
procedural divergences are most dramatic in the details of jury selection
and in the approach to jury participation in trial. Although both peremptory
strikes and for cause strikes exist in the Maltese system,26 voir dire is
nonexistent. In Malta, when a witness is finished answering crossexamination questions, a microphone is passed around the jury box to
facilitate and encourage jurors to directly question the witness.27 Maltese
jurors are expected to actively talk to each other at all stages of the trial.
This small Mediterranean nation presents an opportunity for the
United States. Malta offers relevant, concrete data via a “natural
experiment”28 about how reforms in the areas of jury selection and jury
participation might develop in America. Malta potentially illustrates for
the United States a world with no voir dire, with active juror questioning,
and with ubiquitous jury deliberation.
Finally, in a less direct way, Malta’s experience with jury reform adds
another aspect to the American discussion, as the Mediterranean nation
allows non-unanimous verdicts.29 This type of verdict is not unique to
Malta, as two American states—Oregon30 and Louisiana31—allow felony
25. Because of Malta’s geographic location—an island nation in the
Mediterranean Sea that is south of Sicily, north of Libya, and east of Crete—the
country is a gateway to Western Europe. The World Factbook: Malta, supra note
18 (expand “Geography” section). Its most frequent recurring major crime is drug
crime, typically the importation and sale of heroin. Interview with Judge Michael
Mallia, Judge of Criminal Court, Malta (June 21, 2013). The accused is often not
Maltese. Id. Maltese law gives the accused the option of a trial in either Maltese or
English. Id. The official languages of Malta are Maltese and English. Language,
VISITMALTA.COM, http://www.visitmalta.com/en/language (last visited Oct. 20,
2015). Lawyers and judges are bilingual, and Malta keeps a separate list of possible
jurors who speak English. Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, supra.
26. See CRIM. CODE art. 611(2) (Malta).
27. See id. art. 459 (allowing jury questioning of witnesses).
28. Hans, supra note 3, at 277.
29. See CRIM. CODE art. 610(1) (Malta) (stating that a jury shall consist of
nine jurors); id. art. 468 (requiring a consensus of six jurors in a verdict).
30. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; State v. Sawyer, 501 P.2d 792, 793 (Or. 1972)
(en banc).
31. The Louisiana constitution requires a unanimous decision in capital
cases, but not in cases where “the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard
labor.” LA. CONST. art. I, § 17(A); see also State v. Bertrand, 6 So. 3d 738, 743
(La. 2009).
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convictions on non-unanimous votes, and the United States Supreme Court
has upheld the constitutionality of non-unanimous convictions.32 But Maltese
verdicts may be unique in the self-perceived value of non-unanimous
verdicts—insiders to Maltese jury trials believe that although most Maltese
nine-person juries actually come to a unanimous verdict, the reported verdict,
nonetheless, is seven to two. The reasoning is that every juror can return to
their community and claim whatever side of the vote they wish.33 Thus, the
vote provides insulation by preventing anxiety over post-verdict public
disapproval from corrupting the integrity of the trial. Minimizing this anxiety
is a system concern given little, if any, attention in the United States.
Part I of this Article describes the history of Malta and Maltese jury
practice. Part II briefly summarizes the parallel history of American jury
practice. Part III compares and contrasts the structural aspects of
contemporary Maltese and American jury practice. Part IV draws insights
from Malta that add to the understanding of how American jury practice
is structured and may be refined. Part V anticipates and responds to
potential criticisms of the approach and conclusions of this Article.
I. A CONDENSED HISTORY OF MALTA AND A MORE
DETAILED HISTORY OF MALTESE JURY PRACTICE34
Malta, an archipelago of islands in the Mediterranean Sea, has been
controlled at various points in history by the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians,
the Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Normans, the Argonese, the
Order of the Knights of St. John, Napoleon’s France, and, for most of the
past two centuries, the British.35 Twice in Malta’s history, in the sixteenth
and twentieth centuries, Malta has been the site of military sieges on which
all of western European history arguably turned.36 Malta has been an

32. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972).
33. See Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, supra note 25. A comparative
law analysis should consider how an insider to the system would view the trial.
See Reitz, supra note 16, at 628.
34. This section of the Article goes into some detail about the development
of jury practices in Malta because Malta does not have in its current literature a
manuscript, book, or article that pulls this history together in one place. Malta’s
lack of extant literature self-describing its procedures and rationales is a limitation
of this Article. See Reitz, supra note 16, at 630–31.
35. See History, VISITMALTA.COM, http://www.visitmalta.com/en/history (last
visited Oct. 20, 2015).
36. See generally Knights of St. John, VISITMALTA.COM, http://www.visitmalta
.com/en/knights-of-stjohn (last visited Oct. 20, 2015); British Period, VISITMALTA
.COM, http://www.visitmalta.com/en/british-period (last visited Oct. 20, 2015).

2015]

COMPARATIVE JURY PROCEDURES

453

independent country since 1964 and is a member state of the European
Union and the British Commonwealth.37
Demographically, Malta is the rough equivalent of a mid-sized, highly
homogeneous, densely populated community in the United States. The 2011
census reported the population of Malta as 417,432 people.38 Malta’s land
mass is 122 square miles.39 Population is evenly divided male and female,40
and astonishingly evenly spread by age.41 Over 90% of the country age 10
or older is fluent in Maltese, and over 80% speak English well or average.42
Slightly over two-thirds of Malta’s population has completed at least a
secondary level of education.43 The Vatican estimates that roughly 95% of
Malta is Roman Catholic—the highest percentage of anywhere in the world
other than Italy.44
A. Maltese Juries under the British
Malta’s tradition of trial by jury began immediately following the
British-aided Maltese rebellion against Napoleon Bonaparte, which began
on September 2, 1798.45 Charles Cameron, the First British Commissioner
of Malta, began the century and a half of British rule of Malta on May 14,
1801.46 Twenty-five years later, on November 16, 1826, the architect of
the current Maltese jury system, Sir John Stoddart, began his tenure as the
President of the High Court of Appeal and Senior Member of the Supreme
Council of Justice.47

37. See History, VISITMALTA.COM, http://www.visitmalta.com/en/history
(last visited Oct. 20, 2015).
38. See NAT’L STATISTICS OFFICE, MALTA, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND
HOUSING 2011: PRELIMINARY REPORT 3–4 tbl.1 (2012), available at https://nso
.gov.mt/en/publicatons/Publications_by_Unit/Documents/01_Methodology_and_
Research/Census2011_PreliminaryReport.pdf [hereinafter 2011 CENSUS].
39. See Matt Rosenberg, The World’s Smallest Countries, ABOUT EDUC.
http://geography.about.com/cs/countries/a/smallcountries.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2015).
40. 2011 CENSUS, supra note 38, at xviii fig.4.
41. Id. at xix fig.5.
42. Id. at xxi.
43. See 1 MALTA NAT’L STATISTICS OFFICE, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND
HOUSING 2005 tbl.49 (2007).
44. See David M. Cheney, Statistics by Country, CH (Nov. 20, 2005), http://www
.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/sc3.html.
45. See HUGH W. HARDING, MALTESE LEGAL HISTORY UNDER BRITISH
RULE (1801-1836), at 2 (1968).
46. See id. at 1.
47. See id. at 188.
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Malta first empaneled juries in 1815, where issues of fact in piracy
trials were left to juries to avoid abuse of power by the admiralty.48
Pursuant to a proposal by Stoddart, through Proclamation VI of 1829, on
October 15, 1829, Malta expanded the jury right and adopted a form of
trial by jury for all major criminal cases.49
Stoddart proposed that trial juries should be composed of three
Maltese males and three Englishmen, with a President to be appointed
“from the more intelligent classes (such as Police Magistrates, Advocates,
Civil Officers of the Higher Ranks, Merchants, etc.).”50 Verdicts were
decided by majority vote, with the President holding the tiebreaking vote,
if necessary.51 Verdicts would find each assertion of the indictment proved
or not proved so as to absolve jurors of the pressure of finding guilty or
not guilty.52 Jury trials would occur in the determination of serious
felonies, meaning capital cases and crimes punishable by condemnation to
the galleys for seven years or more.53 Stoddart advocated that jury trials
“would be considered a benefit by every Englishman and by the best
informed of the Maltese.”54 Following the October 15, 1829 adoption of
Stoddart’s proposal, the first five jury trials “succeeded beyond all
expectations.”55
B. Juries in Post-British Malta
Malta gained independence from Britain in 1964.56 The manuscripts
of Professor J. J. Cremona57 and A. J. Mamo58 recorded the form of jury
trials at the time. Professor Cremona was the author of the draft Malta
48. See id. at 148–50. For an island nation strategically located in the center
of the Mediterranean trade routes, admiralty and piracy were central issues in
Malta for longer than recorded history. The creation of juries in response to
distrust of the alternative echoes the concern animating the original jury rights in
the United States. See Michael Teter, Acts of Emotion: Analyzing Congressional
Involvement in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 153, 163–64
(2008); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (asserting that the jury
provides an accused with an “inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge”).
49. See HARDING, supra note 45, at 148–150.
50. See id. at 191–92.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 193.
53. See id. at 191.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 258.
56. The World Factbook: Malta, supra note 18 (expand “Introduction”
section).
57. See The Jury System in Malta, supra note 22.
58. See A. J. Mamo, Notes on Criminal Procedure 132–33 (1942) (on file in
the Melitensia Collection of the Library of the University of Malta).
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Independence Constitution, and at the time he published his manuscript in
1964, he was completing his tenure as Attorney General of Malta.59 Mamo
was the first President of Malta, and he wrote his “Notes on Criminal
Procedure” in 1942—the year he joined the Attorney General’s office as
Crown Counsel; for years afterwards law students in Malta would purchase
them as a resource.60 At the time of Maltese independence, jury trials still
occurred only in criminal matters.61 Perhaps unsurprisingly in a small
country, much of Maltese procedure is organic rather than codified, and
although the Preamble of Proclamation VI of 1829 contemplated the
possibility of civil juries, these juries have never been put into practice.62
Within criminal law, substantive Maltese law derived from the Napoleonic
codes, but procedural law was modeled on the English system.63 To be eligible
for jury service, one had to be a male over 21 residing in Malta, of good
character, fluent in Maltese, a property owner, and competent—meaning
neither interdicted nor incapacitated, not involved in bankruptcy proceedings,
neither currently a criminal defendant nor a convicted criminal, and not unfit
to serve due to a notorious physical or mental defect.64 Postal workers,
apothecaries, and doctors were exempt from jury service.65 Maltese juries were
comprised of nine jurors,66 with the potential of up to three alternates.67 Lists
of potential jurors were compiled annually—one general list and another of
jurors who spoke English.68 From these lists, monthly venires were compiled.69
Sub-lists were also compiled of jurors with prior experience, and from this list
jury foremen were selected.70
At time of trial, potential jurors were assembled from the lists, with
lawyers for each party having three peremptory challenges, and unlimited
challenges for cause.71 The lawyers had to exercise these challenges
immediately upon a juror’s name being randomly drawn at the commencement
of a trial, as the juror became part of the jury immediately once he was sworn
in.72 All juries were sequestered during trial, and without leave of court had
59. See 1 MICHAEL J. SCHIAVONE, DICTIONARY OF MALTESE BIOGRAPHIES
A-F 612–13 (2009).
60. See 2 MICHAEL J. SCHIAVONE, DICTIONARY OF MALTESE BIOGRAPHIES
G-Z 1084 (2009).
61. See The Jury System in Malta, supra note 22, at 573.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 572.
64. See id. at 131–32.
65. See id. at 132.
66. Id. at 573.
67. See id. at 576; Mamo, supra note 58, at 133–34.
68. See Mamo, supra note 58, at 132–33.
69. See id. at 133.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 134–35.
72. See id.
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no access to food or water during deliberations.73 But within these
parameters, jurors were robustly empowered during trials, as they could
discuss the case among themselves throughout trial, could directly question
witnesses, and could put questions to the judge during deliberations.74 A jury
reached a verdict—which required the consensus of at least six jurors—of
guilty, not guilty, or not proven.75
Today, the Maltese Criminal Code changes jury practice very little
from the one Cremona and Mamo described.76 There are no civil juries.77
There are two criminal courts in Malta, with one each on the island of
Malta and the island of Gozo, and all jury trials are held in the criminal
court in Valletta on the island of Malta.78 Although occasional public
criticism of juries in Malta endures,79 the criminal jury has “merged so
completely into the Maltese legal system that is [sic] has long been
regarded as an essential and living part of it.”80

73. See id. at 193, 198.
74. See id. at 193, 195, 198.
75. See id. at 198–200.
76. See CRIM. CODE arts. 436–80, 603–19, 611(2) (Malta).
77. See Seán Patrick Donlan, Biagio Andò & David Edward Zammit, “A
Happy Union”? Malta’s Legal Hybridity, 27 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 165, 199
(2012).
78. See Email from Judge Michael Mallia, Judge for Criminal Court, Malta,
to Author (June 9, 2014) (on file with author). At the time of this email, the judge
of this court was Michael Mallia. Judge Michael Mallia served as Judge of the
Superior Court of Malta from September 29, 2009 to March 26, 2015. See
Curriculum Vitae, Mr. Justice Michael Mallia, available at www.ju
diciarymalta.gov.mt/file.aspx?f=545; Not Enough Judges and Magistrates on the
Bench – Judge Michael Mallia, M ALTA I NDEPENDENT (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2015-03-26/local-news/Not-enoughJudges-and-Magistrates-on-the-bench-Judge-Michael-Mallia-6736132814. To
the extent there are “unwritten rules” of Maltese jury practice, he is an excellent
resource; indeed some of his tenure he was the jurist presiding over every Maltese
jury trial. Email from Judge Michael Mallia, Judge for Criminal Court, Malta, to
Author, supra. Judge Mallia’s descriptions of the actual, but unwritten, aspects of
Maltese practice are not only interesting anecdotally, but also are important for a
thorough comparative law analysis. See Reitz, supra note 16, at 629–30. Judge
Mallia reviewed for accuracy this Article’s descriptions of Maltese practice.
79. See, e.g., Miram Dunn, Acquittals Blamed on Jury System, MALTA
TODAY (July 8, 2001); Editorial, The Jury System, MALTA TODAY (Apr. 8, 2001);
Matthew Vella, Still on Jurors List!, MALTA TODAY (Dec. 17, 2006).
80. Donlan et al., supra note 77, at 200 (quoting The Jury System in Malta,
supra note 22, at 572).
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II. A CONDENSED HISTORY OF AMERICAN JURY PRACTICE
The United States Constitution provides for criminal juries in Article
III81 and the Sixth Amendment,82 and provides for civil juries in the
Seventh Amendment.83 Even when the Founders adopted these
provisions, juries were controversial in that the public perceived juries
as incompetent and easily manipulated.84 Still, the Founders protected
the right to a jury trial in three separate parts of the Constitution.85 This
protection arose primarily because one catalyst of the American
Revolution was a perceived attempt by the British to take away jury
rights.86 Further, American colonists frankly preferred the risk of inept
jurors to the risk of corrupt judges.87
At the time of the American Revolution, every colony had a jury trial
system derived from the British system.88 Although the text of the
Constitution does not explicitly adopt the British form of jury practice,
the courts of the United States repeatedly have held that the
constitutionally-preserved jury rights are indeed the jury practices of the
British.89 Jury reform pressures have never been far from public
consciousness, and the past two centuries have been characterized as a
steady trend toward a retraction of the role of the American jury.90 Even
though the frequency of jury trials is currently declining,91 the core right
to trial by jury in America, especially in a criminal trial, remains robust
and seemingly inviolate.92

81. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
84. See Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is
Unconstitutional, and Why that Matters, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1077, 1095–98
(2013).
85. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST.
amend. VII; Klein, supra note 84, at 1095–98.
86. Klein, supra note 84, at 1095–98.
87. See id.
88. See Klein, supra note 21, at 1008–12.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass.
1812); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898).
90. See generally Kenneth S. Klein, Unpacking the Jury Box, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325 (1996) (discussing trends in American jury reforms).
91. See Shauna M. Strickland, Beyond the Vanishing Trial: A Look at the
Composition of State Court Dispositions, NAT’L CENT. STATE CTS., http://cdm16
501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/adr/id/41 (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
92. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 7–8, 4 tbl.2.
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III. CONTEMPORARY SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
CURRENT MALTESE JURY PRACTICE AND TYPICAL
JURY PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
Maltese and American jury practices are virtually identical in broad
structure, but sometimes divergent in detail. In particular, the countries
differ in how jurors are selected, the degree to which jurors are active and
interactive during a trial, and how jurors reach a verdict.93
Malta has an expansive view of who can be a juror. Although the age
of majority in Malta is 18,94 a juror must be at least 21.95 In addition, a
juror must be a resident of Malta; speak Maltese; be of good character;
neither be a felon nor accused of a felony; not currently in bankruptcy,
interdicted, incapacitated; and not be “reported unfit by notorious physical
or mental defect.”96 Government officials, soldiers, doctors, pharmacists,
teachers, professors, police officers, and persons over the age of 60 are
exempt.97
The United States has a similarly expansive view of juror
qualifications. In the majority of American states, a juror must be a citizen
of the state, a resident of the county in which the trial is held, and 18 years
of age.98 A person may be exempted from jury service if that person is not
proficient in English, has a felony conviction, or lacks either citizenship
or residency.99 The most common exemptions are prior jury service or
age.100 Many jurisdictions have “designated various occupational or status
roles for which citizens could claim an exemption from jury service (e.g.,
political officeholders, judicial officers, sole caregivers of young children
including nursing mothers, or sole caregivers of incompetent adults).”101
More than one-third of eligible Americans will serve as a juror at least
once in their lifetime.102
In Malta, the actual selection of jurors is a largely random system. Two
lists of possible jurors—one of Maltese speakers and another of English
speakers—are generated twice annually, and sub-lists are compiled within
93. The comparison here is limited to criminal felony trials, as Maltese law
has no provision for juries in civil trials.
94. CRIM. CODE art. 188 (Malta).
95. Id. art. 603; see also Lorna Mifsud Cachia, The Jury System in Malta:
Can It Be Improved? 146 (2001) (unpublished LL.D. thesis, Univ. of Malta) (on
file at the University of Malta, Melintensia collection).
96. CRIM. CODE art. 603 (Malta).
97. Id. art. 604.
98. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 22.
99. See id. at 21.
100. See id. at 14–15.
101. Id. at 15.
102. Id. at 8.

2015]

COMPARATIVE JURY PROCEDURES

459

these lists of those with prior jury experience.103 The lists are generated
from a meeting attended by “the Commissioner of Police or his
representative, the Senior Magistrate, the Attorney General or his
representative, the President of the Chamber of Advocates and the
President of the Chamber of Legal Procurators.”104 Individuals on the list
are identified by name, profession, and residence.105 Venires are formed
from these lists monthly.106 Juries are comprised of eight jurors drawn at
random from the venire, a foreperson drawn from the sub-list, and up to
six alternates.107 Because Malta does not have voir dire, peremptory strikes
are rarely if ever exercised.108
In the United States, judges and lawyers are far more proactive in jury
selection. For the most part, in the United States juror source lists are
generated from voter registration lists, driver’s license lists, or both.109 The
large majority of American courts allow access to at least a juror’s name
and address before jury selection begins.110 Most also collect preliminary
voir dire information, such as a prospective juror’s marital status,
occupation, and number and ages of any of the prospective juror’s
children.111 From there, either the attorneys alone, or with the help of the
judge, conduct voir dire, although some states mirror the federal approach
of predominantly or exclusively judge-conducted voir dire.112 In noncapital felony trials, the median time spent on jury selection in state court
is two hours.113 The vast majority of states require a 12-person jury in
felony trials.114
In Malta, jurors are active decision-makers throughout trial. During
the run of the trial, jurors have the right to question witnesses.115 After one
round of lawyer-conducted direct examination and one round of lawyerconducted cross-examination, a microphone is handed to the jury box,
allowing the jurors to ask any questions they have.116 Jurors also are free
103. CRIM. CODE art. 605 (Malta).
104. Id.
105. Id. art. 605(2).
106. Id. art. 606.
107. Id. arts. 605, 610, 611(1).
108. See Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, Judge of Criminal Court, Malta
(June 10, 2011).
109. MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 13–14.
110. See id. at 25 tbl.20.
111. See id. at 26.
112. See id. at 28 tbl.21.
113. See id. at 28.
114. See Alisa Smith & Michael J. Saks, The Case for Overturning Williams
v. Florida and the Six-Person Jury: History, Law, and Empirical Evidence, 60
FLA. L. REV. 441, 443 (2008).
115. CRIM. CODE art. 459 (Malta).
116. See Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, supra note 108.
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to discuss the case with each other during trial.117 Additionally, the judge
sums up the evidence for the jury and explains the law to them,118 and the
jury can ask the judge questions.119
Maltese law provides that as to each charge in the indictment, the
verdict can be guilty, not guilty, or not proven.120 In practice, however, a
verdict that includes the latter option is not provided.121 Rather, “[j]urors
may be instructed, if the case so warrants, to find guilt in a lesser charge
even though not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Indictment provided
the lesser charge is incorporated in the main charge.”122 Six votes are
needed to convict.123
Maltese law forbids lawyers from speaking to jurors, even informally,
after the conclusion of a trial.124 Although juries are no longer required to
be sequestered during trial,125 in practice they usually are.126 Juries are
limited in their authority to deciding issues of fact and applying those
findings of fact to the law.127
In the United States, of course, there is no mimicking of the Maltese
“pass around the microphone” practice and there is, at most, limited juror
interaction with the trial in general. More than two-thirds of courts now
allow jurors to take notes and to have at least one copy of the written
instructions, and over half give jurors guidance on deliberations.128 Or, put
another way, one-third of states still do not allow juror note-taking, onehalf give no guidance to jurors on how to deliberate, and one third do not
even provide jurors with one written copy of the jury instructions.129 Only
14% of state criminal trials allow juror-written questions to witnesses, and
117. CRIM. CODE art. 471(1) (Malta).
118. Id. art. 465.
119. Id. art. 470(1).
120. Id. arts. 436(2), 467, 480(3).
121. See Email from Judge Michael Mallia, Judge of Criminal Court, Malta,
to Author (August 9, 2014) (on file with author).
122. See id. Judge Mallia explains, in practice:
[J]urors can not, out of their own volition return a “Not Proven” verdict
but must be specifically asked to do so by the Court and then only when
a doubt arises on any question of law upon the determination of which
might depend the finding of the jury as to whether the accused is guilty
of the offence. . . . As far as I am aware, this procedure has never been
resorted to, at least for the past ten years.
Email from Judge Michael Mallia, Judge of Criminal Court, Malta, to Author
(August 11, 2014) (on file with author).
123. CRIM. CODE art. 468 (Malta).
124. See Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, supra note 25.
125. CRIM. CODE art. 471(2) (Malta).
126. See Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, supra note 25.
127. See id.
128. MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 32.
129. Id.
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less than 1% allow jurors to discuss the evidence before deliberations
commence.130 All but two states require a unanimous verdict in criminal
cases.131 Therefore, in the United States, modification and reflection on
jury practices is always a work in progress.132
IV. MALTA CAN FILL GAPS IN THE AMERICAN
CONSIDERATION OF JURY REFORM
In both Malta and the United States, felony jury trials look
fundamentally the same and have broadly identical procedures. Even at
the granular level, remarkable similarity exists within some aspects, such
as who is qualified for jury service or what information is known about the
potential jurors before they appear for jury duty. Because of the broad
similarities, Malta can be a useful resource to the United States in the areas
where there are differences, filling in informational gaps. Those
procedural differences primarily arise in how the jury is selected and how
the jurors interact with each other and with witnesses during the trial.
A. Jury Selection
Robust debate exists in the American literature about many aspects of
jury selection.133 Within this literature, many scholars put significant focus
130. Id. at 32 tbl.24. At least one researcher questions whether these numbers
are low. See Mitchell J. Frank, The Jury Wants To Take the Podium—But Even
with the Authority to Do So, Can It? An Interdisciplinary Examination of Jurors’
Questioning of Witnesses at Trial, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 8 (2014).
131. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Revisiting the
Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW.
U. L. REV. 201, 203 (2006) [hereinafter Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement].
132. See generally MIZE ET AL., supra note 4 (documenting “local practices
[of American states] and jury operations in the context of their respective state
infrastructures and . . . provid[ing] a baseline against which state court
policymakers could assess their own systems vis-à-vis their peers and nationally
recognized standards of effective practices”).
133. See, e.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should
be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992); Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the
Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross-Section Guarantee by Confusing It
with Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141 (2012); Joseph A. Colquitt, Using
Jury Questionnaires: (Ab)using Jurors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2007); Shari
Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, Real Juries, 1 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI.
255, 259–62 (2005); Ford, supra note 6; Deborah L. Forman, What Difference
Does It Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 35 (1992);
Hastie, supra note 6; Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array?
A Structural Theory of the Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173
(1995); Nancy J. King, Racial Gerrymandering: Cancer or Cure? A
Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
707 (1993); Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal
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on the utility of peremptory strikes.134 Occasionally, an argument appears
for the elimination of peremptory strikes altogether.135
Peremptory strikes, the right to which lies at the heart of the rationale
for robust jury questioning in the United States, pre-date the country
itself.136 The United States Supreme Court has explained that the purpose
of peremptory challenges is to “eliminate the extremes of partiality on both
sides” and to assure that jurors “will decide on the basis of the
evidence.”137 Yet defending the American approach on the reason
proffered by the Court is difficult. An underlying assumption of both
judges and lawyers in the American system is that counsel are selecting
the most biased jury possible.138 In an adversarial system, the assumption
argues, this competition will balance out the jury.139 The underlying
premise is that the background of a particular juror is a valid place marker
for a point of view.140 That premise is debatable.141 If the premise is wrong,
then the assumption fails, and so the rationale for voir dire weakens. But
even accepting the premise, broadly speaking, little reason exists to
believe that peremptory challenges work, or at least work as intended.142
Therefore, one then returns to the question of the value of voir dire.
Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945 (1998); Hillel Y. Levin & John W.
Emerson, Is There a Bias Against Education in the Jury Selection Process?, 38
CONN. L. REV. 325 (2006); MIZE ET AL., supra note 4; Amy R. Motomura, The
American Jury: Can Noncitizens Still Be Excluded?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1503 (2012);
Mary R. Rose, A Dutiful Voice: Justice in the Distribution of Jury Service, 39 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 601 (2005); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group
Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury
Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 597 (2006); Weddell, supra note
6.
134. See, e.g., Diamond & Rose, supra note 133, at 259–62; King, supra note
133; Motomura, supra note 133; Ford, supra note 6.
135. See, e.g., Felice Banker, Note, Eliminating a Safe Haven for Discrimination:
Why New York Must Ban Peremptory Challenges From Jury Selection, 3 J.L. & POL’Y
605 (1994); Broderick, supra note 133; Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges
Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (1997);
Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1169, 1182–83 (1995).
136. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212–13 (1965).
137. Id. at 219.
138. See Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire An Effective Procedure
For The Selection Of Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 706 (1991).
139. See Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory
Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30
STAN. L. REV. 491, 491–92 (1977).
140. See Kenneth S. Klein & Theodore D. Klastorin, Do Diverse Juries Aid or
Impede Justice?, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 553, 553–59.
141. Id.
142. See Amar, supra note 135, at 1182–84; accord Jacqueline Horan & Jane
Goodman-Delahunty, Challenging the Peremptory Challenge System in
Australia, 34 CRIM. L.J. 167, 185–86 (2010).
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Great Britain, the ancestral system of both the United States and Malta,
has largely abandoned voir dire.143 The United States Supreme Court,
commenting on the British disuse of voir dire, concluded that in Great
Britain jury selection was unnecessary.144 Rather, the Court noted, due in
part to Britain’s superior control of pre-trial publicity, “‘court and counsel
have confidence in the impartiality and integrity of trial jurors . . .’”145
The only empirically demonstrated benefit of attorney-conducted voir
dire is that it generates more candid responses than judge-conducted voir
dire.146 But that benefit only points to who should question potential
jurors, not whether there is a general benefit from questioning potential
jurors at all. Any layperson observing American jury selection quickly
questions whether voir dire enhances the likelihood of justice, as opposed
to simply favoring the side with the more clever lawyer.147 That skepticism
itself undermines the rationale for voir dire, as it goes to the heart of the
rationale of jury questioning as a means to achieve confidence in jury
impartiality and integrity.
Although the gain from voir dire is questionable, the cost is
undisputed. Voir dire and peremptory strikes take time, expend lawyer and
court resources, and are quite possibly ineffective.148 Yet in the American
literature, the closest anyone comes to contemplating the complete
elimination of voir dire is Professor Akhil Amar’s suggestion that, “[b]y
and large, the first twelve persons picked by lottery should form the
jury.”149 As is suggested by the phrase “by and large,” even Professor
Amar, who also largely advocates for the elimination of most strikes for
cause, cannot truly envision and evaluate the possibility of no voir dire
whatsoever.150 Unsurprisingly, given this state of the literature, no
American studies have tested a scenario without voir dire.

143. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218 (1965).
144. See id. (explaining that the difference arises “perhaps because juries [in
the United States] are drawn from a greater cross-section of a heterogeneous
society”).
145. Id. at 218 n.24 (quoting PENDLETON HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
ENGLAND 363 (1931)). There is some empirical support for the notion that pretrial publicity is problematic in the American system. See Dennis J. Devine et al.,
Jury Decision Making, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 687–88 (2001).
146. MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 28.
147. See Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the
Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1084 (1995).
148. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful
Power”, 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 545–46 (1975).
149. Amar, supra note 135, at 1182.
150. See id. at 1183 (“I propose getting rid of almost all ‘for cause’ dismissals
and thus most voir dire. . . .”).
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And, of course, no example from the American courts exists. Today,
all American states and the federal courts have voir dire.151 Roughly 45%
of states have attorney-dominated voir dire, approximately 20% of states
have judge-dominated voir dire, and about 35% of states have equally
shared judge- and counsel-conducted voir dire.152 Apparently in the United
States, eliminating voir dire is beyond imaginable. Ironically, from the
perspective of a Maltese lawyer, almost the exact opposite view emerges.
In her doctoral thesis, Dr. Cachia captured this sentiment, explaining that
“the American system[’s] . . . obsession with the identity of the jurors is
totally erroneous for the whole emphasis of the system is not on the trial
itself, but on the jury. Indeed, it is submitted that each trial by jury is
becoming a trial of jurors.”153
In this regard, Americans advocating for the elimination of peremptory
strikes should be interested in Malta. This small, Mediterranean nation
shows that a court system can function smoothly without voir dire, without
the exercise of peremptory strikes, and with only rare strikes for cause.
Although the Maltese jury essentially is comprised of the first nine names
randomly drawn from the list, no chaos results. Malta suffers no pervasive
protest from the public, from lawyers, or from judges about the
composition of juries.
Of course, one may validly respond that not much can be gleaned from
a lack of protests on jury composition. Malta’s lack of reports of anecdotal
displeasure does not equate to public confidence in jury impartiality and
integrity, or even to actual jury impartiality and integrity. Unsurprisingly,
the literature of this young nation has yet to include even a compilation of
its jury procedures, let alone a study of the consequences of current jury
procedures. Malta’s experience can only go so far in establishing, rather
than merely suggesting, that eliminating voir dire would not impair either
actual or perceived jury impartiality or integrity.
But, in this regard, additional confidence comes from a third nation—
the Republic of Ireland. Ireland, like Malta, has both peremptory strikes
and strikes for cause, and has no voir dire.154 In 2010, the Law Reform
Commission of the Republic of Ireland published a 240-page report on
jury service.155 In its work on jury reform, the Commission looked
151. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 27–28 (classifying voir dire practices
for each state and acknowledging that federal courts perform voir dire as well).
152. See id. at 27–28.
153. Cachia, supra note 95, at 112.
154. See LAW REFORM COMM’N, JURY SERVICE (2010), available at http:
//www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/LRC%20JuriesCP%20f
ull.pdf.
155. See id. The Commission “is an independent statutory body established by
the Law Reform Commission Act 1975. The Commission’s principal role is to
keep the law under review and to make proposals for reform, in particular by
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extensively at jury selection, particularly considering the history of Irish
law and procedure, the approaches of other nations, the academic literature
on the topic, and the merits of the arguments both for and against peremptory
strikes.156 The Commission concluded that retaining the right to peremptory
strikes and strikes for cause was important but that questioning of jurors,
whether oral or written, was more harmful than helpful.157
Thus, Ireland and Malta go further than the most imaginative of
American scholars. Although some commentators in the American literature
advocate for the elimination of peremptory strikes, virtually none advocate
for the elimination of voir dire entirely because strikes for cause remain. For
example, even Professor Amar, who advocates for eliminating most strikes
for cause, writes, “I propose getting rid of . . . most voir dire.”158 The obvious
reason that the American literature does not contemplate eliminating voir
dire is that if any strikes for cause exist, a lawyer would want to retain the
ability to evaluate a possible strike.
When Dr. Cachia reflected on the Maltese experience with jury
selection, she did not advocate for allowing juror questioning, but she did
advocate for disseminating an American-like written juror questionnaire.159
In this regard, the Irish and Dr. Cachia diverge, as the Irish Commission’s
report explicitly considers and rejects the utility of even written questions.160
One should note that, in the absence of even written questionnaires,
Maltese and Irish lawyers work off of the same basic informational pallet
as an American lawyer would in the absence of voir dire, meaning the
recommending the enactment of legislation to clarify and modernise the law.” Id.
at ii.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Amar, supra note 135, at 1183.
159. See Cachia, supra note 95. In particular, Dr. Cachia proposed:

Raising the minimum juror age to 25

Raising the exemption age to 70

Introducing a literacy requirement

Making the definition of good character more complete (such as by
specifying no drug addicts, gamblers, or vagrants)

For societal necessity exempting all medical professionals and teachers,
and for reasons of eliminating bias exempting all legal professionals

Generating the lists of potential jurors with local councils working off of
databases and doing “key man” cross-checks

Having jurors complete simple questionnaires in advance of selection,
probing bias based on “familiarity with the crime or the lawyers, press
coverage, personal history, and the like”
Id. In the ensuing years since Dr. Cachia wrote, Maltese practice has (thus far) not
changed.
160. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 154, at 167 (“[P]ermitting the
questioning of candidate jurors by means of a written questionnaire would not be a
desirable or necessary law reform . . . .”).
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potential juror’s physical appearance, name, address, age, and occupation.161
An American lawyer would recoil at this lack of information on the jurors,
as would Dr. Cachia, who works as a barrister in an adversarial system in
the Maltese courts.162 But when the Irish Commission, which in contrast to
Dr. Cachia has no client interest to consider, looked at jury service from a
societal perspective, the Commission concluded that justice was best served
by not allowing attorneys or judges to conduct any inquiry of jurors beyond
basic information.163
One might postulate that Malta’s system works well for a very small
and insular place, and that Ireland’s system works well for a similarly small
and insular place—outside of Dublin—but that extended voir dire is
necessary in America to prevent the attorneys from knowing nothing about
a potential juror. This is a testable postulation. Neither Malta nor extraDublin, Ireland are less populous or less densely populated than parts of the
United States—arguably, measured by population per square mile, Malta is
densely populated. Thus, if the relevant variable was population size or
density—both highly variable in the United States—one would expect to
see the length of voir dire in the United States roughly correlate to the
population of the state, and diverge between dense low population states
such as Rhode Island and disperse low population states such as Montana.
The National Center for State Courts compiled a list of the average length
of voir dire in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.164 No such pattern
is present.165
So what can be concluded from all of this? The Maltese and Irish
approaches of eliminating questioning of jurors while retaining the right
to both peremptory and for cause strikes perhaps should be characterized
as provocative but not definitive. The Maltese and Irish experiences should
undermine, at least to some degree, any confidence we have in the
conclusion that voir dire is a necessary evil to having a meaningful right
to a peremptory or for cause strike and therefore, the Maltese and Irish
161. See supra Part III.
162. For information on Dr. Chachia, see Dr. Lorna Mifsud Cachia B.A., Mag.
Juris (Eur & Comp. Law), LL.D, Adv.Trib.Eccles.Melit, DINGLI & DINGLI LAW
FIRM, http://www.dingli.com.mt/page.asp?p=7143 (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
163. See LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 154, at 165–67.
164. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 77.
165. Medium population states, such as South Carolina, Alabama and
Virginia, top the list for shortest average voir dire, ranging from 30 to 60 minutes.
Id. Although some large population states like New York and California are near
the bottom, so too is sparsely populated Alaska, and these three range from four
to five hours of average voir dire. Id. And sparsely populated Montana, Rhode
Island, and Wyoming find themselves squarely within the middle with much
larger states, such as Texas and Florida, with all of these states spending an
average of two hours on voir dire. Id.
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experiences should be thought of as natural experiments that provide data
that theoreticians in the United States should consider.
B. Jury Interaction
From the perspective of an American lawyer, another deeply
incongruous aspect of a Maltese jury trial is how the jury behaves during
trial. Malta actually encourages juror questions, as a microphone literally
is passed through the jury box immediately following one round each of
direct and cross-examination.166 And throughout trial, jurors are expected
to discuss the case and their evolving views of it.167
Malta’s view of the way a jury should act and interact during trial is,
quite literally, foreign to the form of most American trials. In all but a
handful of civil trials in the United States, American juries are instructed
to not discuss the trial at all until deliberations begin.168 Typical is Kansas,
where by statute:
If the jury is permitted to separate, either during the trial or after
the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by the
court that: (1) It is their duty not to converse with, or allow
themselves to be addressed by any other person on any subject of
the trial, and that any attempt to do so should be immediately
reported by them to the court; (2) it is their duty not to make any
final determinations or express any opinion on any subject of the
trial until the case is finally submitted to them; and (3) such
admonition shall apply to every subsequent separation of the
jury.169
In recent years, a robust discussion has taken place in American literature
on the desirability of an interactive jury.170 And though the courtroom
166. See CRIM. CODE art. 459 (Malta); Email from Judge Michael Mallia,
supra note 122.
167. See Interview of Criminal Court Judge Michael Mallia (June 3, 2011).
168. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 32 tbl.24.
169. KAN. STAT. ANN. §22-3420(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Regular
Session). It will be detailed further below why Kansas in particular is an apt point
of comparison.
170. See, e.g., B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”:
Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229 (1993) (advocating
for letting jurors discuss the evidence throughout trial); Increasing Juror
Participation, supra note 5 (advocating for allowing juror questions); Steven I.
Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85
NW. U. L. REV. 190 (1990) (advocating for allowing juror questions); Nicole L.
Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: “To Ask or Not To Ask, That is
the Question”, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1099 (2003) (arguing that data demonstrates
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empirical work on juror questions in particular has been a slightly bumpy
road, this road has pointed in a clear direction. The social science literature
would predict that juror questions are of value to the fact-finding function
of the jury.171 The debate in the American legal literature largely is not about
whether juror questions have fact-finding benefits. Rather, the debate about
juror questions devolves into arguments about balancing informed advocacy
and decision making against concerns about distraction, disruption, loss of
objectivity, wasting time, or distorting the proper role of the jury.172 Notably,
even those opposing juror questions do not assert that jurors should ideally
be passive receptacles of information.173
In an effort to bring empirical evidence to the debate over various
methods to increase juror interaction with witnesses and each other, social
scientists Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod conducted two courtroom studies
in which they attained “the data for the first experiment . . . from the judges,
lawyers, and jurors for 67 Wisconsin state court trials; the data for the
second from the judges, lawyers, and jurors for 160 state and federal court
trials conducted in 33 states.”174 Within this set, Heuer and Penrod studied
juror questions in 33 Wisconsin criminal trials and 71 federal trials.175 The
results of the work of Heuer and Penrod largely affirmed the expectations
of advocates of juror questions. As one frequently raised concern with juror
questions is the possibility of jurors asking objectionable questions,176 the

that juror questions enhance jurors as fact finders); Michael Wolff, Comment,
Juror Questions: A Survey of Theory and Use, 55 MO. L. REV. 817 (1990)
(advocating for juror questions); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Questions
During Trial: A Window into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1925 (2006)
[hereinafter Juror Questions] (advocating allowing juror questions); Juror
Discussions During Civil Trials, supra note 5 (reporting on and evaluating the
Arizona experiment with juror questions and allowing jurors to discuss the case
pre-deliberation); Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Some Suggestions for the
Critical Appraisal of a More Active Jury, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1990)
(advocating for a more critical evaluation of the possibility of juror questions).
But see Lundy, supra note 5 (advocating against allowing juror questions in
criminal trials); N. Randy Smith, Why I Do Not Let Jurors Ask Questions in Trials,
40 IDAHO L. REV. 553 (2004) (arguing against juror questions).
171. See Dann, supra note 170, at 1238–47.
172. See Juror Questions, supra note 170, at 1931–34; Mott, supra note 170;
Lundy, supra note 5.
173. See, e.g., Lundy, supra note 5, at 2032–34 (arguing that juror questions
should be disallowed because the goal of truth should be subordinate to other
system goals).
174. Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 5, at 256–57.
175. Id. at 259 (“In the national study, juror questions were allowed in 71 trials
. . . .”).
176. See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 170, at 826–27; Frank, supra note 130, at 10.
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studies assuage these concerns by suggesting that “[j]urors do not ask
inappropriate questions.”177
Another closely related concern with juror questions is that counsel
will be reluctant to object to juror questions.178 Again, the studies of 104
trials indicate that this is not a problem.179 The concern is raised that
allowing jurors to be active questioners will alter the neutrality of the
jurors as decision makers.180 The Wisconsin and federal studies found,
“[j]urors allowed to ask questions do not become advocates rather than
neutrals.”181 But in one respect, the results were surprising. Though the
studies found that juror questions advanced juror understanding, juror
questions did not advance reaching the truth nor assist the lawyers.182
The Wisconsin and federal studies did little to quell any debate over
the desirability of juror questions. Despite the results of these two studies,
the concerns of bias, inappropriate questions, or pressures on advocates
regarding objections all persisted.183 The National Center for State Courts,
citing the work of Heuer and Penrod, among others, reported in its 2007
177. Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 5, at 260.
178. See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 170, at 826–27.
179. See Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 5, at 260 (“If the lawyers
do object, the jurors are not embarrassed or angry. . . . If counsel objects and the
objection is sustained, the jury does not draw inappropriate inferences from the
unanswered question.”).
180. See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 170, at 829–33.
181. Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 5, at 260. Heuer and Penrod
state:
This article summarizes the results of two courtroom experiments
investigating the consequences of allowing jurors to take notes and to
direct questions to witnesses during trials. The data for the first
experiment were obtained from the judges, lawyers, and jurors for 67
Wisconsin state court trials; the data for the second from the judges,
lawyers, and jurors for 160 state and federal court trials conducted in 33
states.
Id. at 256–57. Heuer and Penrod further stated:
Twenty four percent of the jurors’ questions were objected to . . . . [and]
the attorneys were in considerable agreement about which questions
were objectionable. . . . [T]wo-thirds of the lawyers’ objections were
sustained. . . . Jurors do not ask inappropriate questions. . . . Counsel are
not reluctant to object to inappropriate juror questions. . . . If the lawyers
do object, the jurors are not embarrassed or angry. . . . If counsel objects
and the objection is sustained, the jury does not draw inappropriate
inferences from the unanswered question. . . . Jurors allowed to ask
questions do not become advocates rather than neutrals. . . . Jurors do not
overemphasize answers to their own questions at the expense of other
trial evidence.
Id. at 260.
182. See id. at 260.
183. See Lundy, supra note 5, at 2024–32; Juror Questions, supra note 170,
at 1929–30, 1932–34.
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comprehensive study of jury practices in the state courts, “[a] substantial
and growing body of empirical research has found that [permitting written
juror questions], if properly controlled by the trial judge, improves juror
comprehension without prejudicing litigants’ rights to a fair trial.”184
Furthermore, even more recent studies, such as the Arizona Videotaping
Project, indicated the need to limit juror questions to written questions in
a controlled environment that provided tools for a judge to discourage too
many questions.185
Therefore, confining the focus only to juror questions, what can Malta,
a country with so few jury trials that for several years all were conducted
in a single courtroom,186 add to the discussion? In this regard, because
Malta allows oral questions by jurors, Malta contributes in two ways. First,
the country is a natural experiment that can provide further clarity on the
desirability of written juror questions. Second, the Maltese experience
suggests that if America decides that written juror questions should be
allowed, then America will not have gone far enough; Malta illustrates that
oral juror questions should also be allowed.
The Maltese experience is a natural experiment that can further clarify
whether written juror questions are desirable. The empirical compilation
and interpretation of both the National Center for State Courts187 and the
Arizona Videotaping Project188 suggest that juror questions under
controlled conditions—to minimize jurors asking too many questions or
the wrong questions—can improve trials. The question is whether
controlled conditions are necessary. Malta provides the data to answer this
question. Whatever concerns exist about an unchecked jury when juror
questions are allowed, those concerns should be magnified when oral
questions are allowed. Whatever pressure exists on judges and lawyers to
not interfere with juror questions, those pressures magnify in the context
of a question that is already asked, rather than just submitted in writing.
Just imagine objecting to a juror question to that juror’s face. If the
concerns are real about jurors asking too many questions or the wrong
questions, those concerns should be magnified and inescapable in Malta.
But in Malta, those concerns are not apparent.

184. MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34–35; see also Dann, supra note 170, at
1239–46, 1253–55.
185. See Juror Questions, supra note 170, at 1965–72. Pilot programs also
have been undertaken in New Jersey and Minnesota. See Mott, supra note 170, at
1104–06; see Frank, supra note 130 (describing and analyzing a recent survey of
Florida Ninth Judicial Circuit judges on jury questioning).
186. See supra note 78.
187. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34–35.
188. See Juror Questions, supra note 170, at 1965–71.
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Malta’s experience also suggests that if the United States decides to
allow that written juror questions, then it also has reason to allow oral juror
questions. The primary benefit of having an interactive jury as decisionmaker is the pedagogical and psychological advancement of an informed
verdict.189 The inevitable result of requiring the jury to submit questions in
writing is twofold. First, the immediacy of the “question and answer”
interchange is undermined. Second, some submitted questions will not be
asked. Both of these work to the detriment of actively engaging individual
jurors in their task. The benefit of oral juror questions is particularly
compelling if people disregard the concerns animating the proposed
restrictions on written juror questions. And the Maltese experience suggests
those concerns should be ignored in America.
Malta’s experience with an interactive jury, of course, takes this natural
experiment one step further. Malta expects the jury to confer and deliberate
throughout the entire course of the trial.190
United States courtrooms recognize the interrelationship between juror
questions and pre-deliberation jury discussion of the case. Occasionally,
state courts in the United States have allowed jurors to discuss the evidence
among themselves before final deliberations, albeit almost entirely in civil
cases.191 In particular, Delvine states:
In 1995, the Arizona Supreme Court allowed this practice and
permitted trial court judges the discretion to prevent some juries from
discussing cases prior to deliberation, allowing its impact to be
assessed through a field experiment. Although data were still being
collected and analyzed at the end of [the] review period, an initial
report based on the questionnaire responses of trial participants
suggests a mixed but generally positive reaction. Most jurors who
were allowed to converse prior to deliberation reported doing so, and
jurors as well as judges generally felt that predeliberation discussion
produced beneficial results. At the same time, attorneys and litigants
were somewhat less enthusiastic about the reform, and its impact on
jury verdicts is still unclear.192

189. See generally Dann, supra note 170, at 1241–44 (discussing the “realitybased” behavioral model of the juror).
190. See Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, supra note 108. Judge Mallia
was shocked that this is not the norm in the United States and wondered what we
expect the juries are talking about during trial. Id.
191. MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34–35.
192. Devine et al., supra note 145, at 668–669 (citations omitted). One can
find a more detailed description of the Arizona study in an excellent article in the
Arizona Law Review. See Juror Discussions During Civil Trials, supra note 5.
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Interestingly, even though allowing in-trial deliberation was an Arizona
experiment that was part of the same project that allowed juror questions, the
reporters on the project did not analyze the two procedural reforms as an
integrated possibility.193
Although the American literature is largely silent on the effects of
deliberation during trial, one presumes the rationale of the ubiquitous “don’t
discuss the case among yourselves until deliberations” instruction is the
concern that jurors will not decide the case in the manner intended. Reasons
for skepticism of the instruction as a bandage for that concern are wellfounded, as “jurors often do not make decisions in the manner intended by the
courts, regardless of how they are instructed.”194 Further, many jurors talk
about the trial before deliberations begin, despite instructions to the contrary.195
In 1993, Judge Michael Dann of the Maricopa County Superior Court in
Phoenix, Arizona—having considered and rebuked the assumptions about
how jurors behave—wrote, “future research should be conducted to
demonstrate the effects of an ‘affirmative’ instruction permitting jurors, under
certain restrictions, to discuss evidence during the trial.”196 In this regard, Malta
can again serve as that research.
The Maltese system consists of criminal trials where jurors routinely
discuss the case throughout the trial.197 As a positive consequence of this, juror
questions not only give advocates insight into an individual juror’s thinking,
but also into the collective thinking of the jury. Obviously, when jurors are
allowed to ask witnesses questions, the jurors implicitly share their individual
views with each other and the advocates through their questions. Even if
concerns with juries forming pre-deliberation conclusions are valid, that
concern is essentially moot once juror questioning is allowed.
Malta offers the United States a natural experiment on whether juror
interaction during trial distorts trial accuracy or fairness. Notably, Malta has
not articulated any concerns with its process. Rather, Judge Mallia would ask
the following questions: “What do you expect the jurors to talk about? How do
you expect them to reach their decision?”198
C. An Additional Contribution of Malta to the American Discussion of Jury
Reform: Non-Unanimous Verdicts
The third way in which Malta diverges from the overwhelming
majority of American states is that the former allows convictions with non193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See Juror Questions, supra note 170.
Devine et al., supra note 145, at 699.
See Dann, supra note 170, at 1263.
Id. at 1264.
See Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, supra note 108.
Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, supra note 25.
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unanimous verdicts.199 That alone is not informative on the American
experience. In Apodaca v. Oregon,200 the United States Supreme Court
held that constitutionally, a state criminal court could convict by a 10-2 or
an 11-1 vote,201 and indeed Oregon202 and Louisiana203 do not require
unanimity in criminal felony trials.204 These two states provide the data set
one needs to evaluate the typical terms of the debate on the unanimity
requirement—balancing efficiency and justice, primarily in the context of
a concern over hung jury rates.205 However, there is an apparent quirk of
Maltese practice—albeit one that is known purely through anecdotal
evidence—that adds to the American literature by raising a concern not
previously directly considered, and thus merits at least brief exploration.
For a period of time, a single Maltese judge, Michael Mallia, presided
over every jury trial in Malta. He reported that it was his belief that
although every trial he observed reported a seven to two verdict, the
decisions were actually unanimous.206 His belief was that that jurors
wanted the ability to return to their communities and if necessary claim
that they—as an individual juror—did not vote to convict or to acquit.207
In other words, by reporting a non-unanimous verdict, each juror is
insulated from after-the-fact disapproval of the community and friends of
the defendant or the juror.208

199. See CRIM. CODE art. 468 (Malta).
200. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
201. Id. at 410–11.
202. OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; State v. Sawyer, 501 P.2d 792, 793 (Or. 1972)
(en banc) (citing Apodaca to uphold the constitutionality of non-unanimous
verdicts).
203. The Louisiana constitution requires a unanimous decision in capital cases
but not in cases where “the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor.”
LA. CONST. art. I, § 17(A); see also State v. Bertrand, 6 So. 3d 738, 743 (La. 2009)
(citing Apodaca to uphold the constitutionality of non-unanimous verdicts).
204. See Kate Riordan, Ten Angry Men: Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal
Trials and Incorporation After McDonald, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403,
1404 (2011).
205. See, e.g., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement, supra note 131, at 204;
George C. Thomas III & Mark Greenbaum, Justice Story Cuts the Gordian Knot
of Hung Jury Instructions, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 893, 918–19 (2007);
Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, and the Protection of
the Holdout Juror, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 582–83 (2007) (roughly 2% of
federal trials and 5% to 6% of state trials end in hung juries).
206. Interview with Judge Michael Mallia, supra note 25.
207. Id. Judge Mallia speculated that the way juries serially reached this
strategy of self-constructing a plausible deniability of postion was by having the
fore of the jury—who was drawn from a list of persons who had served on a jury
before—orally passing on this strategy of positional insulation.
208. Id.
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Assuming the accuracy of Judge Mallia’s anecdotal observations and
conclusions, then does the Malta approach work? There is some reason to
believe that it does.
By code, Malta provides for three types of verdict: guilty, not guilty,
and not proven.209 Scotland has utilized the not proven option for nearly
300 years,210 and occasionally other nations, including the United States,
consider the verdict.211
The verdict choice of not proven accounts for between one-fifth and
one-third of all Scottish acquittals.212 This latter statistic suggests, and
initial empirical work confirms, that the verdict option of not proven
“clearly impacts the decision making processes of jurors.”213 One
explanation of this “impact” is that in between one-fifth and one-third of
all Scottish acquittals, the jury is communicating that the prosecutor failed
in meeting his or her burden, but the defendant may well actually be
guilty.214 But theoretically, an alternative explanation is that in some
instances, juries are choosing the not proven option as a means of lessening
post-verdict stigma.
Malta’s experience at least is suggestive in sorting through these two
explanations because apparently Malta does not have hung juries.215
Although Malta does not require unanimity, the empirical work in the
United States demonstrates that eliminating the unanimity requirements
does not eliminate hung juries.216 Add to this equation that although Malta
by code allows a verdict of not proven, Malta does not actually make that
option available to juries. Judge Mallia observes:

209. See CRIM. CODE arts. 436(2), 467, 480(3) (Malta).
210. See Lorraine Hope et al., A Third Verdict Option: Exploring the Impact
of the Not Proven Verdict on Mock Juror Decision Making, 32 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 241, 241–42 (2008). For more information on the “not proven” verdict in
Scotland, see Samuel Bray, Not Proven: Introducing a Third Verdict, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1299, 1301–03 (2005).
211. See Hope et al., supra note 210, at 242.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 251.
214. See id. at 241–42.
215. Email from Judge Michael Mallia, supra note 78 (“There is no data but I
know that all juries reach a verdict. . . . As regards percentages of guilty verdicts,
again, there is no data but I know that drugs and pedophile cases nearly always
return a guilty verdict, other cases like for example murder, attempted murder,
grievous bodily harm etc. not so sure . . . Also, a lawyer may be successful
invoking a justifiable or excusable reason for the crime which could affect a guilty
verdict.”).
216. Roughly 60% of hung juries in the United States have more than two hold
out jurors. See Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement, supra note 131, at 207–08;
see also William S. Neilson & Harold Winter, The Elimination of Hung Juries:
Retrials and Nonunanimous Juries, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (2005).
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[J]urors cannot, out of their own volition return a “Not Proven”
verdict but must be specifically asked to do so by the Court and
then only when a doubt arises on any question of law upon the
determination of which might depend the finding of the jury as to
whether the accused is guilty of the offence. . . . As far as I am
aware, this procedure has never been resorted to, at least for the
past ten years.217
This information helps to sort through the two explanations of the
Scottish experience. If an advantage of the three verdict choices is
positional insulation and the primary disadvantage of the unanimity
requirement is the increase in hung juries, then in a jurisdiction that has
another mechanism for positional insulation and does not require
unanimity, there should be no hung juries, with or without the actual
deployment of the three verdict choices. That is what is seen in Malta.218
How does this inform on jury practice in the United States? A great
deal of United States literature addresses controlling the influence on
verdicts of either pretrial publicity or anxiety of jurors about pressure from
others, such as media, lawyers, or casual acquaintances to decide a case a

217. Email from Judge Michael Mallia, supra note 122.
218. This comes with a caveat common to any conclusion of causality from
correlation—there may be an alternative explanation. Judge Mallia’s understanding
of why Malta has no hung juries derives from another aspect of Malta’s uncodified
but recurrent form of trials:
At the end of the Judges submissions to the Jury a sample verdict is given
to them which would have been worked out and approved by the Judge,
defence and the prosecution whereby all possible defences would be
included without prejudice to the guilty claim by the prosecution. That
way we avoid the possibility of ever having a hung jury or else more
seriously, having an illegal verdict that may not exist at law. You can
never be surprised what lay jurors can come up with and to avoid that
possibility we give them the multiple legal choices they may consider, at
least we know for sure that even though we may not agree with the
jurors’ choice it would never the less be a legal one and perfectly
enforceable. . . . The important thing is that when they go into the
deliberating room they would know exactly what to consider and its legal
implications. The choice would be up to them but we will not have any
problems with whatever they decide and that verdict would be a legal
one and duly registered. This practice is not covered by any legal
provision but is something developed by our judges to make sure that we
do not get any anomalies at the end of the trial. The system has worked
well, we never have a hung jury and always get a legal verdict.
Email from Criminal Court Judge Michael Mallia (Oct. 13, 2015) (on file with
author). If Judge Mallia is correct, American theorists still should consider means
of protecting jurors from post-verdict opprobrium, but may wish to be more
nuanced in considering the Maltese experience.
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certain way.219 In response at least to the latter of these concerns, the United
States puts in place protections of juror privacy.220 The reasoning of jurors
during deliberations also has protection.221 By doing so, the United States
seems to recognize that the accuracy of jury fact-finding should not be
distorted by juror concern about public reactions to the verdict. But
apparently no consideration exists in either the American literature or jury
procedures of the possibility of anxiety over the reproach a juror may face
from his or her own friends and family, who have access to the juror despite
any structural protection of juror privacy.
It does not matter whether Judge Mallia’s observations and
interpretations of Maltese jurors are idiosyncratic or typical. What matters
is that his observations and interpretations bring to our attention a concern
that has gotten little attention in the extant American literature—
prophylactically insulating jurors from anxiety over opprobrium from
friends and family post-verdict. Focusing on the Malta experience in
conjunction with the Scottish experience identifies two mechanisms for
achieving post-verdict positional insulation—verdict options of not proven
and eliminating unanimity.
But empirical work in the United States suggests a downside to the
Malta approach. Recall that the mechanism of the Malta approach is the
recurring experienced juror. Professors Dennis J. Devine, Laura D.
Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy Seying, and Jennifer Pryce
comprehensively reviewed 44 years of empirical studies of American
juries, and among their results found that “research on forepersons
suggests they may be more influential than other jurors . . . [and]
experienced jurors tend to be somewhat more pro-conviction and
influential than inexperienced jurors, but they also appear to evaluate
evidence in light of their experience in previous trials.”222 Thus, having an
219. See, e.g., Devine et al., supra note 145; Norbert L. Kerr, The Effects of
Pretrial Publicity on Jurors, 78 JUDICATURE 120 (1994); Hillary Cohn Aizenman,
Pretrial Publicity in a Post-Trayvon Martin World, 27 CRIM. JUST. 12 (2012);
Scott M. Matheson Jr. & Randy L. Dryer, Jury Surveys and Pretrial Publicity:
Two Case Studies, 3 UTAH B.J. 2d 8 (1990); Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the
Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity:
An Empirical Study, 40 AM U. L. REV. 665 (1991); Sally R. Weaver, Comment,
Judicial Restrictions on Attorneys’ Speech Concerning Pending Litigation:
Reconciling the Rights to Fair Trial and Freedom of Speech, 33 VAND. L. REV.
499 (1980); Melanie D. Wilson, Juror Privacy in the Sixth Amendment Balance,
2012 UTAH L. REV. 2023; David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s Right to
Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1
(1997); Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Framework for
Court Policies and Procedures, 85 JUDICATURE 18 (2001).
220. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 25–26.
221. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
222. Devine et al., supra note 145, at 677, 696.
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experienced foreperson builds a bias, not based on evidence, in favor of
conviction, which may be discordant with the presumption of innocence
and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” conviction standard.
That is not to say that adding the verdict option of not proven is a
solution without concerns. For example, “for an innocent defendant, a Not
Proven verdict is at best morally unsatisfactory and, at worst, may incur
social sanctions by virtue the of associated stigma.”223
The point of this discussion is not to argue for any particular solution,
but rather to highlight that the Maltese experience raises a system concern
that the United States should explore but apparently has yet to adequately
consider.
V. DEFENDING THE APPROACH OF THIS ARTICLE
A fundamental challenge in any comparative law analysis is to control
for differences, such as cultural differences and norms, that might
minimize the utility of the comparison and to acknowledge differences that
cannot be controlled.224 One may be tempted to explain all Maltese jury
practices as responsive to the size, homogeneity, and geographic isolation
of Malta. But the importance of those features to differentiating Malta
from the United States may be far less than one might imagine. One can
identify an American community of similar size, remoteness, and
homogeneity to Malta, and examine whether the practices in that
community still resemble typical American practices.
Wichita, Kansas, for example, is broadly Malta-like in terms of
population size, remoteness, and homogeneity. Wichita, which is located
in almost the exact middle of the continental United States, in 2014
reported a population of just over 388,413, about 30,000 people smaller
than Malta. Also like Malta, Wichita has an age-diverse population.225 A
glance at any map of the United States illustrates how Wichita, like Malta,
is a geographically isolated major population center.226 One of Malta’s
interesting characteristics is its relative heterogeneity,227 close to 90% of

223. Hope et al., supra note 210, at 251.
224. See Hans, supra note 3, at 277–78.
225. State and County Quick Facts: Wichita (city), Kansas, U. S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/20/2079000.html (last updated Oct.
14, 2015) (26.6% of Wichita’s population is under 18 and 11.5% is over 65 years old).
226. See, e.g., Map of United States Population Density by County in 1990, CTR.
FOR SPATIAL TECHS., http://cast.uark.edu/local/catalog/national/images/maps/Popu
lation.dir/USpop1990.gif (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).
227. Id. (Wichita is about 72% white—64.5% White and not Hispanic nor Latino).
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Wichita’s adult population is at least high school educated,228 and a
majority of Wichita self-identifies as religious.229
Wichita jury practices do not conform or adapt to Wichita’s size,
isolation, and homogeneity. In Kansas, jury selection on average consists
of two hours of attorney questioning of prospective jurors,230 which
concludes in the exercise of both peremptory strikes231 and strikes for
cause.232
Kansas juries are not interactive. In Kansas, throughout the trial, the
judge “may instruct the jury on such matters as in the judge’s opinion will
assist the jury in considering the evidence as it is presented.”233 Kansas
jurors were permitted to submit questions in writing to witnesses in less
than 3% of trials.234 Juries are admonished throughout trial “not to [form]
or express any opinion . . . until the case is finally submitted to them.”235
Although no explicit Kansas constitutional or statutory provision requires
a unanimous verdict, a unanimity requirement can be inferred from the
statutes,236 is assumed by the Kansas Supreme Court,237 and is recognized
by the Kansas appellate courts.238
Wichita has no rules deviating from the practice across Kansas.
Kansas felony trial jury practice is squarely within the norm of American
practice. In particular, within the aspects of practice that this Article
focuses upon—voir dire, jury interaction, and decisional rules—the
practice in Kansas is quintessentially American.
Therefore, Kansas in general, and Wichita in particular, serve as a
useful control for this Article in two ways. First, Wichita rebuts the notion
that due to size, homogeneity, and isolation, no useful point of comparison
228. Id. (Malta’s population is roughly 70% high school educated).
229. Wichita, Kansas, SPERLING’S BEST PLACES, http://www.bestplaces.net
/religion/city/kansas/wichita (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (only roughly 1% of
which identifies as other than Christian, with the largest Christian denomination
being Roman Catholic).
230. MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 77–78.
231. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3412 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Regular
Session).
232. See Id. §22-3410.
233. Id. § 22-3414(3).
234. MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 85.
235. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3420(b)(2); see also Jury Information, 18TH JUD.
D. CT. SEDWICK CNTY. KAN., http://www.dc18.org/dept/jury.shtml (last visited
Sept. 15, 2015).
236. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3421, 22-3423(1)(d) (providing jurors must
agree to a verdict and for mistrial in the absence of agreement).
237. See State v. Kesselring, 112 P.3d 175, 183–84 (Kan. 2005) (reviewing
whether a verdict was unanimous).
238. See, e.g., State v. Buckner, 154 P.3d 42, 44–45 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007); see
also Carol A. Beier, Lurching Toward the Light: Alternative Means and Multiple
Acts Law in Kansas, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 277–79 (2005).
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exists between Malta and the United States. Wichita is a rough American
equivalent to Malta on these metrics, and yet still has American jury
practices. Second, Wichita rebuts the related concern that America’s size
is an impediment to adopting a Maltese approach. America is comprised
of many small places like Wichita, and those places do not, but certainly
could, bend their procedures towards a more regionally-tailored jury
practice.
A stark substantive difference between jury practice in Malta and jury
practice in the United States is that Malta has no civil juries,239 but several
rebuttals can be made in response to those who believe that this difference
in jury practice makes Malta an impractical comparison for American jury
reforms. First, most of the courtroom experimental data in the United
States comes from civil trials, so in this regard perhaps Malta is even more
important in filling data gaps in the American experience because Malta
provides a data set from criminal trials. Second, virtually none of the world
other than the United States has civil juries,240 so this difference would
discount any foreign nation’s experience for comparative law purposes.
Third, the premise of this Article, as well as essentially all American jury
reform literature, is that juries are important. If so, then it may be of limited
concern that Malta opts to not empanel juries in a less consequential set of
cases than criminal trials. Finally, the suggestion of this Article is not that
America should bow to Maltese practice, but rather that America should
acknowledge and take account of Maltese practice. Thus, unless the
absence of civil juries in Malta rises to the level of justifying totally
discounting the Maltese experience, the lack of civil jury trials is not a fatal
flaw to the comparison.
One might posit that, although Maltese procedures are relevant to
small American jurisdictions, Maltese jury practices are inapplicable to
large American jurisdictions. Much larger justice systems than Malta,
notably Great Britain241 and Canada,242 have no jury selection. These
systems are not dependent upon the premise of “in this community
everyone already knows everyone,” and yet they have no pervasive
concern about the composition of jury panels. Notably, none of the
empirical work cited in this Article on the utility, or lack thereof, of voir

239. See Donlan et al., supra note 77, at 199.
240. Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47
S. TEX. L. REV. 191, 193 (2005) (“The United States is the only country in the
world that routinely employs juries in civil trials.”).
241. In 1988, Great Britain eliminated peremptory strikes. See Criminal
Justice Act of 1988 (UK), §118.
242. See Neil Vidmar, Pretrial Prejudice in Canada: A Comparative
Perspective on the Criminal Jury, 79 JUDICATURE 249, 250 (1996).
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dire is focused on the size of the community or on any other demographic
aspect of the community.243
The same is true of the work analyzing the desirability of a more active
and interactive jury. None of the work is grounded in the assumption of a
small, isolated, homogeneous trial venue.244 For example, the current
experiment on allowing jury questions in American courts is occurring in
populous major urban areas such as Phoenix, Arizona.245
Finally, including the verdict option of “not proven” to deal with
potential family and friend disapproval of jury verdicts mimics the
Scottish approach.246 And through that or any other method, the concern
is not limited to small, insular places because everyone, from a resident of
Manhattan to a family farmer, has people they return home to after jury
service, and about whose reactions they may care.
CONCLUSION
Perfection is a noble goal but never a realistic achievement. The
American experience with juries will always be a work in progress. The
research and reflection and reform of that experience has been extensive.
Jury reform is not a purely academic inquiry. As of 2007, at least 38 states
had formal and recent commissions or task forces to examine jury
operations and trial procedures.247
Yet Malta serves as a useful exposure of aspects of American practice
that still need consideration and reconsideration. Malta’s experience
suggests that the United States should reconsider the value of peremptory
strikes, and independently consider the value of voir dire. It also suggests
that allowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses carries little risk, and
indeed these should be oral questions by jurors directly to witnesses.
Finally, Malta’s experience shows that the United States should not fear
active juror deliberation during all stages of the trial, and highlights a
concern little considered in the American literature—juror anxiety over
the reaction of a juror’s family and friends to a verdict. Even if Malta
serves no more function than as a nudge to the United States to think
differently, comparison of the Maltese experience to the American
experience is useful.

243. See supra Part IV.A.
244. See supra Part IV.B.
245. See B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona
Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280 (1996).
246. See Bray, supra note 210.
247. MIZE ET AL., supra note 4, at 9.

